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Abstract 
Despite decades of experience and research, the effects of minimum wage legislation (MWL) on 
long-run economic performance have rarely been studied since Stigler’s (1946) classic exposition 
about the shortcomings of MWL. In this study, we use a novel method to estimate the magnitude 
and transmission channels by which MWL affect productivity and GDP growth. Our results 
suggest that countries with MWL have a growth rate of about 20 to 30 percent lower than the 
sample mean. Although the initial impacts are small, in the ‘steady state’ where the marginal effect 
of the legislation years equals zero, a country will have a growth rate of about 30 to 38 percent 
lower than the average.  
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1.  Introduction 
‘Why, when the economist gives advice to his society, is he so often coolly ignored? He never 
ceases to preach free trade . . . and protectionism is growing in the United States. He deplores the 
perverse effects of minimum wage laws, and the legal minimum is regularly raised each 3 or 5 
years.’ -- George Stigler, cited in Rustici (1985). 
According to the theory of regulation, the demand for and supply of economic 
regulation is not about the public interest at all, but is a process by which interest groups seek to 
promote their interests while politicians or governments seek to maximize their support or reduce 
the private costs they incur in their course of administration (for the classic discussions, see Stigler, 
1971 and Posner, 1974). MWL has long been a controversial issue. Its supporters typically argue 
that it can reduce poverty and bring the income of the lowest-paid workers up to some acceptable 
standard. Most economists argue that it may price out low-skilled workers, discriminate against 
minorities, and cause unemployment to rise, and that it may not necessarily help the poor 
households it targets. Despite the ongoing debate over the merits of MWL, it is a politically 
attractive tool that politicians and governments can use to show their concern and support for 
reducing poverty and income inequality. It is popular, simple, and visible, does not require 
significant direct government expenditure in the immediate term, and does not entail costs for 
politicians. Politicians can thus use such legislation to win the support of specific interest groups 
and spread the potential social costs widely across the economy. Indeed, the costs of MWL may 
never be recognized since they may be fully realized only after decades have passed. Moreover, 
the costs to individuals may be so indirect, widespread and insignificant that the ‘rational 
ignorants’ dare not to understand and challenge such legislations. (Olson, 1965) 
Since Stigler’s (1946) classic exposition on the shortcomings of MWL, a substantial 
proportion of investigations and discussions have concentrated on its potential negative effects on 
employment, on the overall earnings of workers, and on the flow of workers between the formal 
and informal sectors, as well as its effectiveness in reducing poverty and income inequality. The 
literature about the methodologies, findings, issues, controversies, and debates on MWL are 
well-documented in Neumark and Wascher (2008). These investigations and debates center on the 
short-run and marginal effects of changing the minimum wage (MW) level. Despite the great 
volume of theoretical and empirical literature on the determinants of growth, few studies have 
sought to gauge the effects of this labor market regulation on long-run economic performance. 
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Decades of experience and research have yielded very little knowledge about its general impacts 
on productivity and economic growth, and the channels by which it influences these measures.  
Our contribution to the literature on this relatively uncharted area is twofold. The first 
and most obvious one is our estimations on the magnitude of and the transmission channels by 
which MWL affect productivity and GDP growth with a novel method. To the best of our 
knowledge, this has scarcely been attempted before now. On a higher level, our findings 
demonstrate how a bad institution can sap the strength of a nation over time. Economic 
development and growth require ‘good institutions’: institutions that facilitate equal opportunities, 
competitions, innovations, and maximize the gains realized from the division of labor and 
exchange.2 MWL effectively deprives the rights of the individuals with marginal productivity 
lower than the minimum wage to participate in formal job market. Moreover, the vested interest 
groups generated by such legislation will demand increasing protection and benefits by exerting 
political pressure on the government. They trigger competition between a diverse range of interest 
groups for government regulations and benefits. An increasing amount of resources are thus 
allocated to such interest groups under the influence of coercive power, resulting in declining 
growths in productivity, capital, and GDP over time. In the new MWL literature, there is a debate 
over how long it takes for MWL to have a full effect on labor market. (for instance, Neumark and 
Wascher, 2006) Our findings suggest that it takes decades for the full impact of MWL on 
economic growth to be seen and therefore, for its full effect on poverty and employment 
opportunities to be realized. Although the initial effects of MWL is small, at the ‘steady state’ 
where the marginal effect of the legislation years equals zero, a country will have a growth rate of 
about 30 to 38 percent lower than the average in the sample. Moreover, the effects of MWL are far 
more complicated and damaging than might be expected.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical 
framework for the empirical models and estimations. This is followed by a description of the data 
and statistics. Section 4 reports on our detailed empirical estimates and analyses based on a panel 
data set covering the period from 1970 to 1985. Section 5 attempts to see whether the main 
conclusions in Section 4 remain intact with the estimations based on the observations ranging from 
1985 to 2004. The findings of our investigation are concluded in the last section.  
                                                            
2 For some classic discussions, see North (1981, 1990) and Olson (1982). 
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2. Analytical Framework 
Following the framework developed in Mo (2000, 2001) which has been applied, 
modified or extended for various investigations with remarkable robustness, we use this novel 
method to estimate the effects of MWL on the growth rates of productivity GDP. The input-output 
relationship is characterized by a general production function of the form:  
(1)   ),( LKTfY   
where Y is the total output level, T is a total factor productivity index, and K and L are the 
endowment of capital and labor, respectively. 
Total differentiation of Y gives: 
(2)   )( dLfdKfTfdTdY LK   
Dividing (2) by Y, we have: 
(3)   
L
dL
f
Lf
Y
dKTf
T
dT
Y
dY L
K   
Equation (3) states that economic growth in an economy is driven by the growth of capital and 
labor endowments, while the other growth determinants are captured by the growth rate of 
productivity. The equation can be expressed as equation (4): 
(4)   ],,[ dLLIYFGR  , 
where GR and  are the growth rates of real GDP and total factor productivity, respectively, IY is 
the investment output ratio, and dLL is the growth rate of labor. F equals 1, FIY is the marginal 
product of capital, and FdLL is the elasticity of output to labor. 
Based on the findings in the growth literature, productivity growth is determined 
by the initial level of real GDP per capita and the stock of human capital, such that:  
(5) ( MWL,HUM ,y0 )  , 
where MWL is the MWL variables, HUM is human capital and y0 is the initial GDP per capita; 
MWL y0, 0   ; and 0HUM . 
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The focus of our investigation is the growth effect of the MWL variables that include whether and 
how long MWL have been adopted in an economy. General economic theory suggests that MWL 
has a negative effect on the rate of productivity growth as discussed in Section 1. 
Schumpeter (1912, 1939) suggests that private investment is positively related to the 
growth rate of total factor productivity.3 That is, IY = IY(), with IY > 0. Substituting (5) into (4), 
we have: 
(6) GR F[ ( MWL,HUM , y0 ),IY( ),dLL]  4 
The growth of total factor productivity not only drives GDP growth directly, but also affects the 
profitability of investment and therefore the investment ratio.5 The total effect of WLR on the 
growth rate of real GDP is equal to: 
(7)         IY
dGR IYF ( )
dMWL MWL MWL
 

       
Equation (7) states that the total effect of MWL on the growth rate of GDP equals the summation of its 
effects on total factor productivity and on the investment ratio, weighted by the marginal effect of 
capital. All the relevant parameters in equation (7) can be estimated. For this purpose, we will 
estimate three sets of specifications, the first set being: 
(8)          GR F( MWL, HUM , y0, IY ,dLL )  
                                                            
3 For more detailed discussions, see Adelman (1961) and Mo (2000). Briefly, other things being equal, the higher the 
productivity growth rate, the higher the marginal product of investment that will induce higher private investment. 
Note that under this reasoning, IY is an individual choice variable driven by productivity growth while GR is the 
market outcome. There is no simultaneous problem between IY and GR although the coefficient of IY is highly 
sensitive to the control variables included in the regressions. Please refer to Mo (2007) for a detail analysis on the 
possible interpretations of the IY coefficients in the model. 
4 In reality, other than being driven by the growth rate of productivity, IY is also driven by exogenous variables such 
as cultural, institutional, demographic, regional, and historical factors at play in a particular country. Perfect 
collinearity between IY and the development variables will therefore not occur. While many factors can affect growth, 
missing variable problem will arise only when variables that are highly correlated with the MWL and have a 
substantial effect on economic performance are excluded. We can observe the robustness of our conclusions when 
various specifications are estimated in the empirical studies. 
5 Stock of human capital and per capita income tend to evolve very slowly. In a long duration, y0 and HUM will be 
substantially affected by GR and . In this study with duration of five years panel, we assume that they are exogenous 
and tend to capture the basic socio-economic conditions of the countries involved. 
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Regressions based on equation (8), or equivalently equation (6), are used to generate the estimates of 
the marginal effect of capital and of the effect of the MWL on the growth of productivity. The second 
set is: 
(9)   IY g( MWL,HUM ,y0, dLL ).  
Regressions based on (9) provide the estimate of the effect of MWL on the investment ratio. Lastly, 
we will estimate: 
(10)    GR H( MWL, HUM , y0, dLL ).  
Equation (10) is the reduced form of (8) and (9). The only difference between (10) and (8) is the 
absence of the investment ratio. Regressions based on (10) provide the estimate of the total effect of 
MWL on the growth rate. If the relationship of the estimates generated from (8), (9), and (10) matches 
the implication of equation (7), the remarkable coincidence suggests that the proxy for MWL, the 
quality of data in general, the validity of the analytical framework, and the empirical models are 
mutually supportive. 
3. Data and Statistics 
To ensure consistency and reliability, the data on MWL are mainly based on the 
minimum wage database of the International Labor Organization (ILO). Data taken from this 
database are then modified predominantly on the basis of information from the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The dummy for MWL and the corresponding 
number of years it has been introduced are based on the date on which the minimum wage was 
introduced in the OECD database and/or the year of the earliest wage/labor legislation recorded in 
the ILO database. They should be considered as the proxy for MWL rather than precisely the 
duration of MWL has been in force.6 Even for OECD data for which the term ‘year of 
introduction’ is used, this simply refers to the year in which the central features of the existing 
minimum wage system were put in place. However, the remarkable coincidences between the 
                                                            
6 According to the reply received from the ILO office: “… The date of enactment of the respective law (in the 
database) can NOT be used as the date for the introduction of a minimum wage in a country. This is so, since several 
countries adopt new acts every year with an updated minimum wage, some revise their minimum wage system 
completely etc..” Since the ILO office does not hold data about the date minimum wage legislation was introduced in a 
country, we use the earliest date on which wage/labor legislations was recorded in calculating YRR. However, the 
OECD has clear data on OECD countries about the introduction date of minimum wage legislation. They are used to 
modify the ILO data to make the data a closer proxy for the MWL. 
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empirical results and theoretical implications suggest that the proxy does capture the negative 
impacts of MWL and related regulations on the average economic performances across countries. 
There is clearly ample room for improving the MWL data by drawing on a more 
extensive range of information sources. However, our main conclusions remain intact when we 
compare empirical results based on four related data sets subject to different levels of modification 
taken from various sources. A comparison between the ILO data and the final proxy for MWL 
adopted in our regressions is reported in the Appendix Table A4.  
 
Table 1: Correlations Coefficients and Descriptive Statistics  
 
 GR YRR MWD HUM y0 INVP GINV GSIZE INSTAB POPG dHUM ENR.P ENR.H
GR 1             
YRR -0.19 1            
MWD -0.19 0.62 1           
HUM -0.22 0.23 0.02 1          
y0 -0.30 0.19 0.01 0.83 1         
INVP 0.23 -0.20 -0.30 0.36 0.35 1        
GINV 0.23 -0.10 -0.03 -0.32 -0.28 -0.16 1       
GSIZE -0.08 -0.03 0.04 0.08 -0.10 -0.06 0.10 1      
INSTAB -0.13 0.002 0.07 -0.21 -0.27 -0.23 -0.10 -0.05 1     
POPG 0.27 -0.08 -0.07 -0.68 -0.69 -0.30 0.39 0.06 0.13 1    
dHUM -0.09 -0.05 -0.07 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.02 0.04 -0.06 -0.12 1   
ENR.P 0.08 0.07 -0.02 0.48 0.41 0.34 0.13 -0.10 -0.27 -0.33 0.13 1  
ENR.H -0.31 0.13 0.11 0.06 0.04 -0.11 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.003 0.07 1 
YR -0.31 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.14 -0.10 0.12 0.14 -0.0005 -0.05 0.12 0.08 0.67 
ASIAE 0.30 -0.18 -0.13 -0.10 -0.23 0.21 0.09 -0.02 0.03 0.12 -0.02 0.04 0.04 
LAAM -0.20 0.10 0.05 -0.22 -0.24 -0.24 -0.06 -0.18 0.19 0.28 -0.06 0.02 0.15 
OECD -0.18 0.09 0.05 0.63 0.78 0.33 -0.30 -0.10 -0.21 -0.67 0.14 0.30 -0.13
SAFRI 0.03 -0.25 -0.22 -0.29 -0.31 -0.10 0.08 0.27 -0.02 0.28 -0.09 -0.25 -0.09
Mean 4.09 16.8 0.66 4.95 3753 0.16 0.08 0.17 0.09 1.77 0.45 0.94 1.83 
(S. D.) 3.40 19.5 0.47 2.64 2865 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.18 1.08 0.55 0.13 3.16 
Notes:  
1. The above correlation coefficients are based on 203 observations. 
2. GR = growth rate of real GDP in percentage; MWD = minimum wage legislation dummy; YRR = number of years having 
MWL recorded; HUM = average schooling years in total population over age 25; y0 = initial real GDP per capita of each 
period; INVP = ratio of private investment to GDP; GINV = ratio of public domestic investment to GDP; GSIZE = ratio of 
government ‘consumption’ expenditure to GDP; INSTAB = measure of political instability; POPG = population growth rate; 
dHUM = percentage change in human capital; ENR.P =total gross enrollment ratio for primary education; ENR.H = total gross 
enrollment ratio for higher education; YR = dummy for time periods: 1=1970-1974, 2=1975-1979, and 3=1980-1984; ASIAE , 
LAAM, OECD, SAFRI = regional dummies for East Asian, Latin-American, OECD and Sub-Saharan African countries. 
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Insert Table 1 about here 
The non-MWL variables are drawn from the data collection of Barro and Lee 
(1994). The comprehensive study is based on the data in the 1970-1985 period.7 This period is 
divided into three 5-year periods to generate the panel data set used for our investigations in 
section 4. All the data used for empirical analysis matches closely the variables in the analytical 
framework. ‘Average number of years of schooling among the total population over the age of 25’ 
is used as the proxy for the level of human capital. Population growth rate is used as the proxy for 
the rate of labor growth. The annual growth rate of a variable is approximated by fitting the 
compound interest rate formula. 8  Government size is measured by the ratio of nominal 
government ‘consumption’ expenditure to nominal GDP in the data set, less the ratios of nominal 
government spending on education and defense to nominal GDP. The enrolment ratios, 
expenditure on public investment, and other variables are directly obtained from the Barro and 
Lee data collection.9 The correlations among the major variables used in this study and their 
descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 1, with the variables defined in the notes to the table.  
 
4. Empirical Specification and Result: 1970-1985 
The higher the minimum wage, the greater will be the number of covered workers who are discharged. -- 
George Stigler (1946). 
In this section, we report the estimations of the various specifications for the 
decomposition exercises according to equation (7). At the same time, the results of the different 
specifications can be used to assess the robustness of our conclusions. The estimations are based 
on the 1970-1985 sample period in the Barro and Lee data collection, which has been adopted 
extensively in various empirical investigations. The quality of the data set employed is also 
supported by the remarkable consistency among our empirical results and the theoretical 
implications as derived in section 2. In section 5, we assess the robustness of our major 
conclusions using data from the ‘decades of turbulence’ in the period 1985 to 2004. Our empirical 
                                                            
7 To observe the robustness of the conclusions, supplementary empirical studies are conducted to the data in the 
period 1985-2004 which is reported in Section 5. The results in both periods are mutually supportive. 
8 For example, the annual growth rate in real GDP is estimated by finding r in the formula: GDP70*(1+r)5=GDP75, 
where GDP70(75) is the real gross domestic product in 1970 (1975). 
9 The original sources of the observations and acronyms used in the data set are summarized in Appendix Table A2. 
  9
results show that MWL reduces productivity growth directly and indirectly through various 
channels. Moreover, the longer the MWL has been in force, the more destructive they are to an 
economy and the nations involved will degenerate over time.  
4.1    Productivity and Investment Effects 
MWL can have a negative effect on productivity and growth in many ways. Standard 
textbooks on labor market suggest that the legislation and associated labor market regulations 
create rigidities and reduce efficiency by setting minimum wages and extending collective 
agreements on unemployment, retirement benefits, and various other working conditions. Such 
regulations include limits on working hours, anti-discrimination laws, worker participation laws, 
‘employment protection’ laws that restrict the employer’s right to dismiss workers, transfer of 
undertakings laws designed to preserve wages and conditions when businesses are bought. These 
legislations restrict freedom of contract and raise both the risk of investment and the operating 
costs of businesses. Moreover, strong labor unions create additional rigidity that reduces the 
mobility of workers in the labor market. In a dynamic setting, MWL harms the interests of low 
productivity workers. The legislation places barriers to such workers in entering the labor market, 
makes it impossible for them to raise their productivity by gaining on-the-job experience, and 
frustrates their efforts to develop their careers and climb the social ladder. (among others, 
Neumark and Nizalova, 2006 and Hashimoto, 1982) In a welfare state, the unemployed groups 
become an increasing burden on the welfare system that can crowd out productive government 
expenditures. In less developed countries, groups that lack a means of subsistence and work 
opportunities endanger socio-political stability. In addition, recent findings suggest that MWL may 
make people increasingly reluctant to work and encourage them to rely on government protection 
and welfare. As observed by Cunningham (2007), social expenditures in many countries are tied to 
the minimum wage. Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) and Michau (2009) conclude that an overly 
protective welfare state can lead people to invest less in passing on a strong work ethic to their 
children. In general, generous welfare policies and protective legislations foster a natural 
reluctance to work. The declining work ethic and deteriorating social norms generate adverse 
effect on economic performance over time. The vicious cycle of MWL, deteriorating social norms, 
lower growth and opportunities which in turn lead to increased political demands for more 
protective legislations can ultimately bring down a once vibrant market economy. Similarly, MWL 
can bring down marginal firms, raises the costs faced by new entrants, and reduces the profit of 
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surviving firms. They do not only reduce productivity and investment in the current period, but 
may also degrade the valuable social norms of wealth creation, risk taking, and innovation. This 
suggests that economic performance depends not only on whether a country has instituted MWL, 
but also on the number of years for which it has been in place. The longer the legislation has been 
in place, the higher overall damages caused by the ‘cumulative distortions’ on economic 
performance created by the vicious cycle 
Tables 2M and 2Y report the estimations required for the decomposition of the 
productivity and investment effects of the MWL variables based on equation (7). Model 1 (M1, Y1) 
includes only the basic control variables, while model 2 (M2, Y2) includes all possible 
transmission variables investigated in this paper. These models are used to test the robustness of 
our conclusions under different specifications and the results are highly consistent with each other. 
The results shown in Table 2M suggest that countries with MWL have significantly lower private 
investment and economic growth. Based on the results reported in the estimation MAT, the 
existence of MWL in a country reduces the growth rate by about 0.834 percentage points on 
average, or about 20 percent lower than the mean growth rate in the sample period. According to 
the first order effect of the YRR, the YAT estimation indicates that an additional legislation year 
reduces GDP growth rate by about 0.05 percentage points.10 The decompositions reported in 
Table 2D reveal that the theoretical implication of equation (7) and the related estimations is 
mutually supportive to each other. This add-up characteristic provides an additional observation 
that can be used to assess the robustness of the estimates and conclusions drawn from the 
estimations.11 The decompositions indicate that private investment accounts for 45 to 65 percent 
of the total effect of the MWL variables on economic growth. This high collinearity between INVP 
and the MWL variables explains why the MWL variables become much less significant after 
INVP is introduced to the estimations as shown in M1P, MAP and YAP etc..12 
                                                            
10 Since the effect of YRR on GR is non-linear, the actual marginal effect depends on the number of years for which 
MWL has been instituted in a country. For instance, when evaluated at the mean of about 17 years, the marginal effect 
of YRR is: -0.0514 + 5.1N4 (17) = -0.043. Based on the estimates, the marginal effect reaches zero when YRR equals 
50.4. The coefficient of MWD is the average partial effect of MWL on GR in the sample period, irrespective of the 
difference in YRR among countries. 
11 We do not have test statistics for the proximity of the calculated and estimated effects. Allowing for random errors 
in the estimation process, we consider the difference of less than 10 percent to be acceptable. 
12 Based on this understanding, although the estimated effects of the MWL variables on some of the transmission 
variables are statistically insignificant in the following estimations, we use the estimates in calculating the total effect 
in line with the reasoning in equation (7). Statistical insignificance can be explained by the absence of a functional 
relationship between variables. However, as indicated in the MAP and Y1P estimations, it may also be the result of the 
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Table 2M: Productivity and Investment Effect 
Estimation  MAT M1N M1P M2T M2N MAP 
 Dependent Variables 
Indep. Var. GR INVP GR GR INVP GR 
MWD  -0.834 (-1.79)* 
 -0.0385 
(-5.20)***
 -0.431 
(-0.92) 
 -0.943 
(-2.19)** 
 -0.0354 
(-4.75)*** 
 -0.334 
(-0.77) 
y0 
-4.51N4 
(-3.09)*** 
2.29N6 
(0.99) 
-4.54N4 
(-3.32)***
-5.62N4 
(-3.98)***
1.99N6 
(0.82) 
-5.96N4 
(-4.41)***
HUM 0.338 (2.19)** 
0.00363 
(1.48) 
0.151 
(1.03) 
0.342 
(2.06)** 
0.00145 
(0.50) 
0.317 
(1.99)** 
POPG 0.454 (1.52) 
-0.00653 
(-1.39) 
0.575 
(2.05)** 
0.495 
(1.76)* 
-0.00265 
(-0.55) 
0.541 
(2.01)** 
INVP   20.7 (4.97)***   
17.2 
(4.31)*** 
GSIZE    -8.83 (-2.42)** 
-0.0084 
(-0.13) 
-8.69 
(-2.48)** 
GINV    7.33 (1.41) 
-0.177 
(-1.96)* 
10.4 
(2.06)** 
PINSTAB    -3.40 (-2.77)***
-0.0377 
(-1.78)* 
-2.75 
(-2.33)** 
dHUM    -0.536 (-1.38) 
6.53N4 
(0.10) 
-0.547 
(-1.47) 
ENR.P    4.01 (2.00)** 
0.108 
(3.10)*** 
2.16 
(1.10) 
ENR.H    -0.329 (-5.09)***
-0.00174 
(-1.56) 
-0.299 
(-4.80)***
Constant 3.65 (3.40)*** 
0.174 
(10.2)*** 
0.857 
(0.69) 
2.54 
(1.24) 
0.0969 
(2.74)*** 
0.876 
(0.440) 
R2 0.108 0.234 0.228 0.326 0.303 0.386 
# of obs. 216 209 209 203 203 203 
Notes: 
1. For the definitions of the variables, please refer to the notes to Table A.  
2. The expression - 4.15N4 equals - 0.000415 and so forth.  
3. The regressions do not have equal sample size. For simplicity, we utilize the maximum 
number of observations available in the regressions. This is found to have no substantial 
effect on our conclusions.  
4. Inside the parentheses are t-statistics. * , **  and ***  following the t-statistics represents 10%, 
5% and less than 1 % significant level respectively. 
5. Based on the estimate in MAT, irrespective of its years of adoption, countries having MWL 
reduces GR by about 0.834 percentage point or 20.4 percent on average when evaluated at the 
mean. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
multicollinearity problem, or the relationship is relatively small. Since the estimated results are consistent with the 
calculated results reported in Table 2D, we adopt the later interpretation. This understanding applies to the similar 
decomposition exercises conducted in the following subsections. 
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Table 2Y: Productivity and Investment Effect 
Estimation  YAT Y1N Y1P Y2T Y2N YAP 
 Dependent Variables 
Indep. Var. GR INVP GR GR INVP GR 
YRR -0.0514 (-1.67)* 
-0.00152 
(-3.10)*** 
-0.0379 
(-1.28) 
-0.0405 
(-1.43) 
-0.00136 
(-2.75)*** 
-0.0173 
(-0.62) 
YRR2 5.10N4 (0.980) 
1.13N5 
(1.37) 
5.29N4 
(1.09) 
3.12N4 
(0.66) 
9.36N6 
(1.14) 
1.52N4 
(0.337) 
y0 
-4.48N4 
(-3.07)*** 
2.66N6 
(1.14) 
-4.6N4 
(-3.34)*** 
-5.6N4 
(-3.96)*** 
2.07N6 
(0.84) 
-5.96N4 
(-4.39)*** 
HUM 0.375 (2.38)** 
0.00542 
(2.15)** 
0.156 
(1.04) 
0.400 
(2.33)** 
0.00362 
(1.21) 
0.338 
(2.05)** 
POPG 0.517 (1.71)* 
-0.003 
(-0.63) 
0.574 
(2.03)** 
0.595 
(2.08)** 
0.00118 
(0.24) 
0.575 
(2.10)** 
INVP   20.6 (4.98)***   
17.1 
(4.30)*** 
GSIZE    -9.49 (-2.58)** 
-0.0342 
(-0.534) 
-8.91 
(-2.53)** 
GINV    6.73 (1.28) 
-0.197 
(-2.16)** 
10.1 
(1.99)** 
PINSTAB    -3.47 (-2.83)*** 
-0.0407 
(-1.91)* 
-2.77 
(-2.34)** 
dHUM    -0.594 (-1.51) 
-0.00141 
(-0.21) 
-0.570 
(-1.52) 
ENR.P    3.89 (1.93)* 
0.103 
(2.95)*** 
2.12 
(1.08) 
ENR.H    -0.326 (-5.0)*** 
-0.00169 
(-1.49) 
-0.297 
(-4.74)*** 
Constant 3.31 (3.11)*** 
0.150 
(8.85)*** 
0.866 
(0.74) 
2.22 
(1.09) 
0.0832 
(2.34)** 
0.800 
(0.40) 
R2 0.114 0.226 0.232 0.327 0.297 0.386 
# of obs. 216 209 209 203 203 203 
Note:  
1. Please refer to the notes to Tables 1 and 2M. 
2. Based on the estimate in YAT, the first order effect of YRR on GR equals 0.0514. The 
marginal effect of YRR reaches zero with YRR* = 50.4. Evaluated at YRR*, the reduction in 
growth rate equals 1.3 percentage points, or 32 percent when evaluated at the mean.  
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Table 2D: Direct , Investment and Calculated Total Effects 
Model Direct effect (a) Investment effect (b) Total effect (c) c1/c2 b/c2 
M1 -0.431 -0.0385 x 20.7 = -0.797 
c1= -0.834 
c2= (a)+(b) = -1.23 0.68 0.65 
Y1 -0.0379 -0.00152 x 20.6 = -0.0313 
c1= -0.0514 
c2= (a)+(b) = -0.0692 0.74 0.45 
M2 -0.334 -0.0354 x 17.2 =-0.609 
c1= -0.943 
c2= (a)+(b) = -0.943 1.00 0.65 
Y2 -0.0173 -0.00136 x 17.1 = -0.0233 
c1= -0.0405 
c2= (a)+(b) = -0.0406 1.00 0.57 
Notes:  
1. The decomposition is based on equation (7) and the estimations reported in Tables 2M and 2Y. 
2. The estimated effects and total effects are identical in Model M2 and Y2. The less than satisfactory 
results in M1 and Y1 are found to be due to the difference in sample size in MAT and YAT with 
their related estimations. After we control the MAT and YAT to have identical observations of 209 
with the related INVP regressions as in MA1T and YA1T which are reported in Section 4.2, the 
estimated and calculated effects are almost identical. For simplicity and reducing the possibility of 
data manipulations, we do not control the sample size of all estimations. Only when deems 
necessary, we will re-estimate the model with controlled observations for comparison. 
3. Although the estimates on the direct effects related to MWD and YRR are statistically insignificant 
as in MAP and YAP, we use the estimates for the decomposition exercises. We consider that they 
are the victims of multicollinearity or the effect is relatively small rather than their effect on the 
growth rate is actually zero. This treatment is supported by the fact that the calculated total effects 
are almost identical to the estimated total effects when related estimations have the same 
observations. 
 
 
4.2  Effects on Government Size and Government Investment 
The estimations reported in Tables 3M and 3Y are intended to investigate the effects 
of the MWL variables on economic growth through their possible influence on government size 
and government investment. These effects are then decomposed in line with the reasoning in 
equation (7) which are reported in Table 3D. 
MWL directly increases and/or diverts government resources toward regulation and 
enforcement, thereby increasing the size of the government, rigidities and inefficiencies in an 
economy. Any increase in minimum wage has a large effect on other social expenditure in areas 
such as pensions and job training allowances and leads to changes in eligibility criteria for social 
programs and the number of beneficiaries. (Cunningham, 2007) The competitions for benefits may 
also divert resources from other public expenditures like government investment. However, the 
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effect of MWL on the government investment to GDP ratio may be mitigated due to its negative 
effect on the rate of GDP growth over time.13 
Table 3M : Government Size and Government Investment 
Estimation  MAT  MA1T  MGS.V MGS.P MGN.V MGN.P 
 Dependent Variables 
Indep. Var. GR GR GSIZE GR GINV GR 
MWD  -0.834 (-1.79)* 
-1.23 
(-2.64)*** 
 0.00511 
(0.60) 
 -0.783 
(-1.71)* 
 -8.11N4 
(-0.13) 
 -1.22 
(-2.64)*** 
y0 
-4.51N4 
(-3.09)*** 
-4.07N4 
(-2.82)*** 
-1.0N5 
(-3.76)*** 
-5.51N4 
(-3.71)*** 
1.77N6 
(0.92) 
-4.26N4 
(-2.97)*** 
HUM 0.338 (2.19)** 
0.226 
(1.47) 
0.0104 
(3.67)*** 
0.441 
(2.81)*** 
-0.00358 
(-1.74)* 
0.266 
(1.73)* 
POPG 0.454 (1.52) 
0.440 
(1.49) 
0.00387 
(0.71) 
0.493 
(1.67)* 
0.0143 
(3.62)*** 
0.283 
(0.94) 
GSIZE    -9.96 (-2.69)***   
GINV      11.0 (2.12)** 
Constant 3.65 (3.40)*** 
4.45 
(4.17)*** 
0.144 
(7.31)*** 
5.08 
(4.28)*** 
0.0617 
(4.32)*** 
3.77 
(3.41)*** 
R2 0.108 0.135 0.0817 0.137 0.168 0.153 
# of obs. 216 209 216 216 209 209 
Notes:  
1. MA1T is identical to MAT except the observations are controlled to be identical to the estimations 
MGN.V and M1P. 
2. Please refer to the notes to Table 2M. 
3. Based on the estimate in M1AT, MWL reduces GR by 1.23 percentage points or 30 percent when 
evaluated at the mean. 
 
Table 3Y: Government Size and Government Investment 
Estimation  YAT YA1T YGS.V YGS.P YGN.V YGN.P 
 Dependent Variables 
Indep. Var. GR GR GSIZE GR GINV GR 
YRR  -0.0514 (-1.67)* 
-0.0691 
(-2.27)** 
 2.68N4 
(0.48) 
 -0.0486 
(-1.60) 
 -6.93N4 
(-1.71)* 
 -0.0624 
(-2.04)** 
YRR2 5.1N4 (0.98) 
7.61N4 
(1.49) 
-7.95N6 
(-0.83) 
4.27N4 
(0.83) 
1.02N5 
(1.49) 
6.62N4 
(1.29) 
                                                            
13 With MWL in a country, the growth rate of government investment will be reduced when resources are diverted 
toward regulation and related social expenditures. However, MWL also causes the rate of GDP growth in the country 
to fall over time. This may explain why the GINV channel is of lesser importance in the decomposition MGN than in 
that of YGN, as indicated in Table 3D. The coefficient of YRR captures the marginal year effect of MWL, which has a 
smaller effect on the GDP level in the short term. 
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y0 
-4.48N4 
(-3.07)*** 
-4.05N4 
(-2.79)*** 
-9.92N6 
(-3.71)*** 
-5.51N4 
(-3.72)*** 
1.57N6 
(0.81) 
-4.2N4 
(-2.91)*** 
HUM 0.375 (2.38)** 
0.268 
(1.71)* 
0.0111 
(3.83)*** 
0.491 
(3.06)*** 
-0.00358 
(-1.71)* 
0.303 
(1.93)* 
POPG 0.517 (1.71)* 
0.512 
(1.71)* 
0.00476 
(0.856) 
0.567 
(1.90)* 
0.0137 
(3.46)*** 
0.378 
(1.24) 
GSIZE    -10.5 (-2.82)***   
GINV      9.73 (1.85)* 
Constant 3.31 (3.11)*** 
3.96 
(3.74)*** 
0.142 
(7.28)*** 
4.80 
(4.09)*** 
0.0677 
(4.81)*** 
3.30 
(2.98)*** 
R2 0.114 0.137 0.0856 0.147 0.180 0.152 
# of obs. 216 209 216 216 209 209 
Notes:  
1. YA1T is identical to YAT except that the observations are controlled to be identical to the estimations 
YGN.V and YGN.P. 
2. Please refer to the notes to Tables 1 and 2M. 
3. Based on the estimate in YA1T, the first order effect of YRR on GR equals -0.0691. The marginal 
effect of YRR reaches zero with YRR* = 45.4. Evaluated at YRR*, the reduction in growth rate equals 
1.57 percentage points, or 38 percent when evaluated at the mean.  
 
Table 3D: Government Size and Government Investment 
Model Direct effect (a) Govt. expenditure channel (b) Total effect (c) c1/c2  b/c2 
MGS 
(GSIZE) -0.783 
0.00511 x (-9.96) 
= -0.0509 
c1= -0.834 
c2= (a)+(b) = -0.834 1.00 0.061 
YGS 
(GSIZE)  -0.0486 
2.68N4 x (-10.5)  
= -0.00281 
c1= -0.0514 
c2= (a)+(b) = -0.0514 1.00 0.055 
MGN 
(GINV) -1.22 
-8.11N4 x 11.0 
= -0.00892 
c1= -1.23 
c2= (a)+(b) = -1.23 1.00 0.0073 
YGN 
(GINV) -0.0624 
-6.93N4 x 9.73 
= -0.00674 
c1= -0.0691 
c2= (a)+(b) = -0.0691 1.00 0.097 
Notes: 
1. In order to have the identical sample among related estimations, the total effects related to GINV are 
based on the estimates in MA1T and YA1T. For decompositions related to GSIZE, they are based on 
MAT and YAT as the related estimations have the same sample size. 
2. The calculated total effects are identical to the estimated total effects.  
3. The b/c in MGN is much lower than that of YGN. Please refer to footnote 13 for a possible 
explanation. The results in YGN suggests that an additional year of MWL reduces growth rate by 
0.069 percentage points and the government investment channel accounts for about 10 percent of the 
total effect while the government size channel accounts for more than 5.5 percent as indicated in YGS.
 
Insert Tables 3M, 3Y and 3D about here 
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The estimations suggest that the MWL variables raise the government size and reduce government 
investment that result in lowering the rate of GDP growth.14 The estimated and calculated effects 
are identical in the related estimations as indicated in Table 3D.15 
4.3  The Political Instability Channel 
The findings described in the above subsections suggest that MWL has a negative effect on 
productivity and economic growth. Moreover, most research indicates that MW has a sharp 
disemployment effect, particularly among teenagers (Neumark and Wascher, 2006, 2008). MWL 
therefore result in a reduction in personal development opportunities that is likely to lead to 
increased socio-political instability given the excess energy of the unemployed.16 We consider this 
possibility in this section.  
Insert Tables 4MY and 4D about here 
Table 4MY: Political Instability 
Estimation  MAT MS.V MS.P YAT YS.V YS.P 
 Dependent Variables 
Indep. Var. GR PINSTAB GR GR PINSTAB GR 
YRR        -0.0514 (-1.67)* 
 4.69N4 
(0.29) 
 -0.0531 
(-1.79)* 
YRR2    5.1N4 (0.98) 
-1.42N6 
(-0.05) 
5.67N4 
(1.13) 
MWD -0.834 (-1.79)* 
0.0120 
(0.489) 
-0.844 
(-1.88)*    
y0 
-4.51N4 
(-3.09)*** 
-1.92N5 
(-2.49)** 
-5.29N4 
(-3.72)***
-4.48N4 
(-3.07)***
-1.94N5 
(-2.51)** 
-5.26N4 
(-3.69)***
HUM 0.338 (2.19)** 
-0.00338 
(-0.41) 
0.269 
(1.79)* 
0.375 
(2.38)** 
-0.00419 
(-0.50) 
0.301 
(1.96)* 
POPG 0.454 (1.52) 
-0.0150 
(-0.95) 
0.339 
(1.17) 
0.517 
(1.71)* 
-0.0166 
(-1.03) 
0.394 
(1.35) 
PINSTAB   -4.84 (-3.85)***   
-4.81 
(-3.83)***
                                                            
14 The estimations also indicate that government size has negative effect on GR while government investment vice 
versa. The results are consistent with the findings in Mo (2007). 
15 We use the estimates on the effects of WLR variables on government size and government investment in Tables 3M 
and 3Y although the coefficients are statistically insignificant. Please refer to footnote 12 for the reasons supporting 
the practice. The reasoning applies to all decompositions in the coming sections. 
16 Low economic growth may lead to political instability and therefore PINSTAB may have simultaneous problem in 
the growth regressions. However, Alesina et al. (1996) finds very weak evidence of this reverse causality. Rather than 
driven by the growth rate, socio-political instability is probability driven by the levels of inequality, corruption and 
general living quality. (for instance, Mo, 2000, 2001) Most of these effects are likely to have already captured by the 
variables such as y0, HUM and MWL variables included in our specifications. The possible simultaneous bias may not 
be substantial. 
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Constant 3.65 (3.40)*** 
0.202 
(3.52)*** 
4.99 
(4.66)*** 
3.31 
(3.11)*** 
0.210 
(3.69)*** 
4.69 
(4.39)*** 
R2 0.108 0.0900 0.172 0.114 0.0906 0.178 
# of obs. 216 214 214 216 214 214 
Note: Please refer to the notes to Tables 1 and 2M. 
 
Table 4D: Political Instability 
Model Direct effect (a) PINSTAB channel (b) Total effect (c) c1/c2  b/c2 
MS -0.844 0.0120 x (-4.84) = -0.0581 
c1= -0.834 
c2= (a)+(b) = -0.902 0.92 0.064
YS  -0.0531  4.69N4 x (-4.81) = -0.00226 
c1=  -0.0514 
c2= (a)+(b) = -0.0554 0.93 0.041
Note: Related total effects are based on MAT and YAT. 
 
The estimations and decomposition suggest that the MWL variables do have negative effects on 
socio-political stability. They account for about 6.4% and 4.1% of the total effects of the respective 
MWL variables on economic growth. 
 
4.4  School Enrolment and Human Capital 
Theoretically, the effects of MWL on schooling decisions and human capital accumulation are 
ambiguous. According to Cahuc and Michel (1996), MWL does not necessarily have negative 
consequences for economic performance because it can induce greater human capital accumulation. 
A low level of demand for unskilled labor caused by MWL may create an incentive for workers to 
accumulate human capital in an effort to avoid unemployment. However, a higher MW can also 
discourage further education among the poor by enticing some of them to enter the job market.17 
Moreover, it is also possible that the lower levels of productivity and economic growth resulting 
from MWL reduce the expected benefits of education. Family education is highly complementary 
to formal education. Since poor children are endowed with lower family capital, they have a lower 
expected return from formal education. Poverty also raises the subjective discount rate of the 
future benefits because poor children will join the informal sector at an early stage or simply plan 
to live on welfare when employment opportunities are limited. In contrast, children from wealthy 
and middle-class family receive better family support and tend to remain in formal schooling for 
longer when it is difficult to find a good job or successful business ventures in a sluggish economy. 
People may also stay in school to accumulate human capital and to raise their productivity to a 
                                                            
17 Please refer to the different possibilities and findings in related literatures detailed in Neumark and Wascher (2008). 
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level that exceeds the minimum wage. Ehrenberg and Marcus (1982) also find that MWL can have 
different effects on schooling decisions. For white male teenagers, MW reduces enrolments among 
low-income teenagers, but increases enrolments among high-income teenagers. The actual effects 
of MWL on schooling decisions and human capital accumulation can only be settled empirically. 
We estimate the effects of the MWL variables on schooling decisions and the change in human 
capital and assess their respective influence on economic growth.18 
Table 5M: Education Enrollment and Human Capital 
Estimation MEP.V MEP.P MEH.V MEH.P MdH.V MdH.P 
 Dependent Variables 
Indep. Var. ENR.P GR ENR.H GR dHUM GR 
MWD -0.0104 (-0.65) 
-0.793 
(-1.74)* 
0.722 
(1.60) 
-0.668 
(-1.47) 
-0.0559 
(-0.76) 
-0.850 
(-1.82)* 
y0 
2.89N7 
(0.06) 
-4.53N4 
(-3.18)***
5.28N5 
(0.37) 
-4.33N4 
(-3.04)*** 
-2.94N5 
(-1.27) 
-4.6N4 
(-3.14)*** 
HUM 0.0234 (4.41)*** 
0.188 
(1.19) 
0.162 
(1.09) 
0.390 
(2.61)*** 
0.112 
(4.57)*** 
0.370 
(2.29)** 
POPG 6.57N4 (0.06) 
0.445 
(1.52) 
0.521 
(1.80)* 
0.610 
(2.08)** 
0.0668 
(1.40) 
0.473 
(1.57) 
ENR.P  6.22 (3.16)***     
ENR.H    -0.320 (-4.61)***   
dHUM      -0.291 (-0.67) 
Constant 0.826 (22.3)*** 
-1.40 
(-0.726) 
-0.526 
(-0.50) 
3.55 
(3.39)*** 
-0.0893 
(-0.52) 
3.62 
(3.36)*** 
R2 0.245 0.151 0.0289 0.189 0.131 0.109 
# of obs. 214 214 213 213 216 216 
Note: Please refer to the notes to Tables 1 and 2M.  
 
Table 5Y: Education Enrollment and Human Capital 
Estimation YEP.V YEP.P YEH.V YEH.P YdH.V YdH.P 
 Dependent Variables 
Indep. Var. ENR.P GR ENR.H GR dHUM GR 
YRR -9.62N4 (-0.90) 
-0.0448 
(-1.48) 
0.0614 
(2.07)** 
-0.0353 
(-1.17) 
-0.00258 
(-0.53) 
-0.0523 
(-1.69)* 
YRR2 1.17N5 (0.65) 
4.24N4 
(0.83) 
-7.87N4 
(-1.57) 
2.96N4 
(0.59) 
-1.96N5 
(-0.24) 
5.03N4 
(0.97) 
                                                            
18 A higher growth rate may raise the expected return on education and therefore increases the level of investment in 
education. The coefficients of the enrolment variables may be positively biased. However, ENR.P and ENR.H have 
opposite signs on GR and they have the expected signs in all other related regressions. Also, the estimated and 
calculated effects in the decomposition exercises are close to each other. These results suggest that the potential 
simultaneity problem is not serious enough to damage our conclusions. 
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y0 
2.00N7 
(0.04) 
-4.48N4 
(-3.13)***
6.09N5 
(0.43) 
-4.27N4 
(-2.99)*** 
-2.77N5 
(-1.20) 
-4.58N4 
(-3.12)*** 
HUM 0.0238 (4.38)*** 
0.226 
(1.40) 
0.145 
(0.95) 
0.422 
(2.76)*** 
0.121 
(4.86)*** 
0.419 
(2.52)** 
POPG 0.00108 (0.10) 
0.511 
(1.72)* 
0.508 
(1.73)* 
0.668 
(2.25)** 
0.0817 
(1.70)* 
0.550 
(1.79)* 
ENR.P  6.10 (3.10)***     
ENR.H    -0.314 (-4.50)***   
dHUM      -0.362 (-0.83) 
Constant 0.825 (22.41)*** 
-1.67 
(-0.86) 
-0.48 
(-0.46) 
3.22 
(3.08)*** 
-0.148 
(-0.88) 
3.26 
(3.05)*** 
R2 0.247 0.155 0.0401 0.193 0.144 0.117 
# of obs. 214 214 213 213 216 216 
Note: Please refer to the notes to Tables 1 and 2M. 
 
Table 5D: Education Enrollment and Human Capital 
Model Direct effect (a) Human capital channel (b) Total effect (c) c1/c2  b/c2 
MEP 
(ENR.P) 
-0.793 
 
-0.0104 x 6.22 
= -0.0647 
c1= -0.834 
c2= (a)+(b) = -0.858 0.97 0.075 
YEP 
(ENR.P) -0.0448 
-9.62N4 x 6.10 
= -0.00587 
c1= -0.0514 
c2= (a)+(b) = -0.0507 1.01 0.12 
MEH 
(ENR.H) 
-0.668 
 
0.722 x (-0.320) 
= -0.231 
c1= -0.834 
c2= (a)+(b) = -0.899 0.93 0.26 
YEH 
(ENR.H) 
-0.0353 
 
0.0614 x (-0.314) 
= -0.0193 
c1= -0.0514 
c2= (a)+(b) = -0.0546 0.94 0.35 
MdH 
(dHUM) 
-0.850 
 
-0.0559 x (-0.291) 
= 0.0163 
c1= -0.834 
c2= (a)+(b) = -0.834 1.00 0.020
# 
YdH 
(dHUM) 
-0.0523 
 
-0.00258 x (-0.362) 
= 0.000934 
c1= -0.0514 
c2= (a)+(b) = -0.0514 1.00 0.018
# 
Notes:  1. # absolute value of (b/c2).  
2. Total effects are based on estimates in MAT and YAT respectively. 
 
Insert Tables 5M, 5Y and 5D about here 
The results reported in Tables 5 suggest that MWL reduces the enrolment rate in primary 
education (ENR.P). People deprived of primary education can be very destructive as it is very 
difficult to accumulate human capital through self-learning and ‘learning from doing’ if they 
cannot read, cannot perform simple calculations and cannot have a job. In contrast, MWL raises 
the enrolment rate for higher education (ENR.H) but results in a lower growth rate that accounts 
for more than 26 percent of the total effect. The general effects of the MWL variables on the 
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change in human capital are negative. Ironically, a reduction in human capital investment has a 
positive effect on growth when the social benefit of human capital is lower than its social cost. A 
reason is due to the misallocation of schooling resources induced by MWL: under-investment in 
primary education and over-investment in higher education as indicated above, in additional to the 
other adverse effects of MWL on the marginal social benefits of human capital when productivity 
and employment opportunities are reduced.19 
4.5  Population Growth Rate 
According to the fertility literature, household fertility decisions are based on cost and 
benefit calculations.20 MWL is normally found to result in a higher unemployment rate among 
unskilled laborers (Neumark and Wascher, 2008). The higher unemployment rate raises the 
relative value of high-quality children who can get a job in comparison with children who cannot 
get a job. As a result, households reduce the number of children produced while allocating their 
saved resources to raise the quality of their existing children by extending the duration of their 
schooling within the limits of their financial capabilities. As a result, the MWL variables have a 
negative effect on the population growth rate but a positive effect on the enrolment rate in higher 
education as founded in the previous subsection. The results in Table 6D do indicate that the MWL 
variables have a negative effect on the population growth rate, and account for more than 7 percent 
of the total effect. 
 
Table 6MY : Population Growth Rate 
 
Estimation  MPOP.T MPOP.V MPOP.P YPOP.T YPOP.V YPOP.P 
 Dependent Variables 
Indep. Var. GR POPG GR GR POPG GR 
YRR        -0.0570 (-1.85)* 
 -0.0108 
(-1.55) 
 -0.0514 
(-1.67)* 
YRR2    6.52N4 (1.26) 
2.74N4 
(2.35)** 
5.1N4 
(0.98) 
MWD -0.897 (-1.93)* 
-0.139 
(-1.31) 
-0.834 
(-1.79)*    
y0 
-5.22N4 
(-3.77)*** 
-1.56N4 
(-4.92)*** 
-4.51N4 
(-3.09)*** 
-5.28N4 
(-3.81)*** 
-1.56N4 
(-4.98)*** 
-4.48N4 
(-3.07)*** 
HUM 0.279 (1.86)* 
-0.131 
(-3.81)*** 
0.338 
(2.19)** 
0.300 
(1.97)** 
-0.146 
(-4.26)*** 
0.375 
(2.38)** 
                                                            
19 As in most resource allocation problems, there is a social optimal level of investment in schooling years, as detailed 
by Mo (2002), among many others. 
20 See Pritchett (1994), among others, for a review of the relevant theories. 
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POPG   0.454 (1.52)   
0.517 
(1.71)* 
Constant 5.05 (9.30)*** 
3.10 
(24.93)*** 
3.65 
(3.40)*** 
4.91 
(9.57)*** 
3.09 
(26.63)*** 
3.31 
(3.11)*** 
R2 0.0978 0.521 0.108 0.102 0.534 0.114 
# of obs. 216 216 216 216 216 216 
Notes:  
1. Please refer to the notes to Tables 1 and 2M. 
2. Based on the estimate in MPOP.T, WR reduce GR by 0.897 percentage points or 22 percent.  
3. Based on the estimate in YPOP.T, the first order effect of YRR on GR equals 0.057. The 
marginal effect of YRR reaches zero with YRR* = 43.7. Evaluated at YRR*, the reduction in 
growth rate equals 1.25 percentage points, or 30 percent when evaluated at the mean.  
Table 6D: Population Growth Rate 
Model Direct effect (a) Population Growth (b) Total effect (c) c1/c2 b/c2 
MPOP -0.834 -0.139x0.454 = -0.0631 
c1= -0.897 
c2= (a)+(b) = -0.897 1.00 0.070 
YPOP -0.0514 -0.0108x0.517 = -0.00558 
c1= -0.0570 
c2= (a)+(b) = -0.0570 1.00 0.098 
Note: The total effects reported in c1 are based on the estimates in MAT and YAT respectively. 
 
Insert Table 6MY and 6D about here. 
4.6  The Overall Situation 
When the transmission variables are correlated with each other, the estimates of the 
regressions in the previous subsections will be biased. In this section, we estimate the respective 
effects of the transmission channels on the growth rate by including all transmission variables in the 
model at the same time and then calculating the overall effect based on the following formula: 
(7) .)()(
MWL
INVP
INVP
GR
MWL
TV
TV
GR
MWL
GR
dMWL
dGR
TV 






   
where TV includes government size, government investment, political instability, the enrolment ratios, 
change in human capital, and the population growth rate. 
In the previous estimations, no regional or year dummies which might be correlated 
with the MWL variables were introduced. To further assess the robustness of our findings, Table 
7D decomposes all the transmission variables simultaneously and compares the decompositions 
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based on the estimations with and without the control of the regional and year dummies.21 The 
decompositions in MAP.D and YAP.D are respectively based on the estimates in MAP and YAP 
and the related estimates of the effect of the MWL variables on the transmission variables reported 
in the previous tables. MDUM.D and YDUM.D are decomposed based on the estimations reported 
in Tables A1.MDUM and A1.YDUM in the Appendix respectively. This decomposition exercise 
allows us to assess whether our major conclusions remain intact when the regional and year 
dummies are included in the regressions. 
After the dummies are added to control for the possible time dynamics and regional 
characteristics, the coefficients of the MWL variables become more significant statistically and in 
magnitude. The dummy variables appear to have captured some regional characteristics that are 
closely correlated to the MWL variables and the transmission variables. As revealed by the ratios 
between the estimated effect (e1) and the calculated effect (e2) in MDUM.D and YDUM.D, the 
totals are not particularly close to each other. This is expected, as the decompositions are based on 
many regressions with different sample sizes. However, all the variables have the expected signs 
and the results indicate a high level of consistency among the estimations of all various 
specifications and decomposition analyses.22  
Table 7D: The Overall Picture with and without Dummy Variables 
Estimation MAP.D MDUM.D YAP.D YDUM.D 
Direct Effect -0.334 (26%)  -0.637 (50%) -0.0173 (23%)  -0.0364 (48%) 
Investment  -0.0354x17.2 = -0.609 (47%) 
 -0.0319x12.6 
= -0.401 (31%) 
-0.00136x17.1 
= -0.0232 (31%) 
-0.00110x13.0 
= -0.0142 (19%) 
Population Growth -0.139x0.541 = -0.0750 (6%) 
-0.0964x 0.828 
= -0.0798 (6%) 
-0.0108x0.575 
= -0.00621 (8%) 
-0.0120x 0.859 
= -0.0103 (14%) 
Govt. Size  0.00457x(-8.69) = -0.0397 (3%) 
 0.00918x(-8.48) 
= -0.0779 (6%) 
2.17N4x(-8.91) 
= -0.00193 (3%) 
 5.34N4x(-8.74) 
= -0.00467 (6%) 
Govt. Investment  -0.00261x10.4 = -0.027 (2%) 
 -0.00558x2.06 
= -0.0115 (1%) 
-8.31N4x(10.1) 
= -0.00839 (11%) 
 -0.00127x1.19 
= -0.00151 (2%) 
                                                            
21 The equations system with the regional and year dummies included for decomposition purposes is reported in Table 
A1 in the Appendix. Mo (2003) performs a decomposition exercise on land distribution inequality to explain the 
difference in productivity growth between LAAM and ASIAE. Regional dummies embody a bundle of regional 
characteristics that may include different institutional characteristics specific to each region. In additional to the 
possible time dynamics of the dependent variables, one potential concern is that the effects of the MWL variables 
might be driven by other regional characteristics that are correlated with the MWL variables. The regression results 
and the associated decomposition exercise suggest that all our major conclusions remain intact after we control the 
possibilities. 
22 In the estimations for the effects of the MWL variables on INVP in Tables A1.MDUM and A1.YDUM, we include 
all transmission variables in the regressions for comparison purpose. We find that our conclusions remain intact 
whether the transmission variables are included or not in the INVP regression. 
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Political Instability  0.0142x(-2.75) = -0.0390 (3%) 
0.00924x(-2.26) 
= -0.0209 (2%) 
6.53N4 x(-2.77) 
= -0.00181 (2%) 
3.15N4x(-2.32) 
= -7.31N4 (1%) 
Higher Education  
Enrollment  
0.644x(-0.299) 
= -0.193 (15%) 
0.195*x(-0.236) 
=-0.0461 (4%) 
0.0554x(-0.297) 
=-0.0165 (22%) 
0.0212x(-0.239) 
=-0.00506 (7%) 
Primary Education 
Enrollment 
-0.0105x2.16 
= -0.0226 (2%) 
-0.0132x4.85 
=-0.0640 (5%) 
-9.73N4x2.12 
=-0.00206 (3%) 
 -0.00131x4.81 
=-0.00631 (8%) 
Change in Human  
Capital 
-0.0652x(-0.547) 
= 0.0357 (3%) 
 -0.105x(-0.509) 
= 0.0534 (4%) 
-0.00347x(- 0.570) 
= 0.00198 (3%) 
 -0.00692x(-0.537)
= 0.00372 (5%) 
Total Effect 
e1= -1.28 
 [-1.23] 
e2= -1.30 
e1/e2 = 0.98 
e1= -1.02  
e2= -1.28 
e1/e2 = 0.80 
e1 = -0.0743 
[-0.069] 
e2 = -0.0745 
e1/e2 = 0.997 
e1= -0.0643  
e2= -0.0755 
e1/e2 = 0.85 
Notes:  
1. e1 in MAP.D and YAP.D is based on the estimations with 209 observations under the same 
specifications as in MPOP.T and YPOP.T respectively while the numbers inside […] are of the 216 
observations reported for comparison. 
2. Based on the estimate reported in Table A1.MDUM, the total effect of MWL on GR equals 1.02 
percentage points or 25 percent when evaluated at the mean. 
3. Based on the estimate reported in Table A1.YDUM, the first order total effect of YRR on GR equals 
0.0643 while the second order effect of 8.55N4. The marginal effect of YRR reaches zero with YRR* 
= 37.6. Evaluated at YRR*, the reduction in growth rate equals 1.21 percentage points, or 29.6 
percent when evaluated at the mean. 
 
Insert Table 7D about here 
In general, the estimates under the various specifications suggest that countries with MWL 
typically have a growth rate about 20 to 30 percent lower than the sample mean over the period 
studied. At the ‘steady state’ where the marginal effect of YRR equals zero, a country will have a 
growth rate about 30 to 38 percent lower than the average.23 In the decompositions reported in 
Table 7D, the direct impact of the MWL variables accounts for more than 23 percent of the total 
effect. This suggests that through its effects on the incentive structure facing all economic agents, 
MWL has pervasive, significant, and complicated effects on the behavior of the diverse range of 
economic agents. These effects on the ultimate economic outcomes such as GDP growth and 
investment are still substantial after the various transmission variables are taken into consideration.   
5.  Do Our Main Conclusions Remain Valid in the ‘decades of turbulence’? 
Over the past two decades, revolutions in information technology (IT) have resulted in 
much greater globalization and an increasing digital divide on both national and international level. 
                                                            
23 We disregard the increasing effect of YRR on GR beyond YRR*. The positive effect is theoretically unlikely. 
Moreover, YRR* ranges from about 38 years to 50 years in the estimations while the average YRR is only about 17 
years in the sample. 
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These trends have spawned a transitional period marked by frequent bouts of economic turbulence. 
The global adjustment process generated by technological shocks has been reflected by the 
widespread financial crises experienced in recent decades and by surges in productivity and GDP 
growth in countries and sectors that have been able to be benefitted from the IT revolution. The 
unstable socio-economic environment generated by domestic and international digital divides has 
resulted in national economic data that may not reveal long-run equilibrium conditions.24 To 
minimize the possible effect of the shocks caused by region-specific disturbances such as the Latin 
American and Asian financial crises on our estimations as well as the stage of institutional 
development divergences among different regions, we separate countries into regions before 
conducting our analysis. We also introduce the GDP and trade-GDP ratio (TRADE) variables into 
our regressions as in ASM3 and OEY3 to capture the potential effects of the IT revolution and 
globalization on the growth performance.25 The estimations are based on panel data sets of 5 years 
in the period 1985-2004. We do not attempt to repeat all the exercises performed in Section 4 due 
to data limitations and the transitional properties in this period. We find that only the estimations 
for the ASIAE and OECD countries, which are known to have more stable and mature economic 
and socio-political institutions, generate the expected results, while the estimations based on 
LAAM and SAFRI countries are not stable.26 The regression results reported in Tables 9AS and 
9OE, though not as comprehensive as those given in Section 4, indicate that our basic conclusions 
based on the detailed analyses in the previous sections are likely to remain intact even in this 
turbulent period if the institutional quality of different regions and countries are properly 
controlled. The coefficients of the MWL variables have the expected signs in all estimations. 
However, they are statistically more significant in the ASIAE countries than their OECD 
counterparts. A possible reason is that the OECD sample has much higher average YRR than its 
counterpart as indicated in Tables A3AS and A3OECD.27 Another reason is that the OECD 
countries have inherited similar institutional traditions such that the deviations in their MWL 
variables might have over-represented their divergences in related regulations. 
                                                            
24 Please refer to Mo (2008) and Norris (2001) for the related literature and discussions, among many others. 
25 Advances in IT have substantially reduced domestic and international transaction costs, which has been of 
particular benefit to large economies and/or those that rely heavily on international trade. 
26 The estimation results based on the LAAM and SAFRI countries are unstable and the sign is sometimes not as 
expected. This may be due to the unstable international and domestic environment generated by the technological 
shock in the period that results in more unstable and pronounced influences to these countries with less matured 
economic and socio-political institutions. 
27 The related data source, simple statistics and list of the countries involved in the regressions are reported in 
Appendix Tables A3. 
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Table 8AS: ASIAE Countries 
Estimation MAS1 MAS2 MAS3 YAS1 YAS2 YAS3 
 Dependent Variables 
Indept. Var. GR GR GR GR GR GR 
YRR    -0.277 (-2.53)** 
-0.228 
(-2.03)* 
-0.252 
(-1.56) 
YRR2    0.00483 (2.13)** 
0.00452 
(2.06)** 
0.00418 
(1.30) 
MWD -4.43 (-2.47)** 
-4.31 
(-1.95)* 
-2.06 
(-1.01)    
POPG 0.00667 (0.008) 
0.178 
(0.17) 
0.0407 
(0.05)  
-0.240 
(-0.39) 
0.0978 
(0.14) 
INVP   0.0673 (0.74)   
0.121 
(1.07) 
y0 
-2.12N4 
(-1.59) 
-1.73N5 
(-0.06) 
-4.75N5 
(-0.20)  
4.15N5 
(0.33) 
-1.97N4 
(-1.54) 
GSIZE -0.104 (-1.23) 
-0.147 
(-1.39) 
-0.0572 
(-0.60)    
TRADE  -0.0126 (-0.75) 
0.00288 
(0.19)    
GDP  -4.97N12 (-0.91) 
2.39N12 
(0.44)    
YR   -1.82 (-2.93)***  
-1.83 
(-3.51)***  
Constant 14.0 (5.07)*** 
15.6 
(4.75)*** 
12.2 
(2.97)*** 
9.78 
(9.70)*** 
13.8 
(7.18)*** 
7.31 
(1.71)* 
R2 0.236 0.261 0.488 0.183 0.464 0.265 
# of obs. 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Notes:  
1. Please refer to the notes to Tables 1 and 2M. In addition, TRADE = (import + export)/GDP; 
GDP = real GDP. YR = dummy for time periods: 1=1985-1989, and so on. 
2. Based on the estimate in YAS2, the first order effect of YRR on GR equals 0.228. The marginal 
effect of YRR reaches zero with YRR* = 25. Evaluated at YRR*, the reduction in growth rate 
equals 2.85 percentage points or 38 percent evaluated at the mean of 7.58 reported in Table A3 in 
the Appendix. 
 
Table 8OE: OECD Countries 
Estimation MOE1 MOE2 MOE3 YOE1 YOE2 YOE3 
 Dependent Variables 
Indept. Var.  GR GR GR GR GR GR 
YRR    
-0.0173 
(-1.05) 
-0.0143 
(-0.88) 
-0.0338 
(-2.14)** 
YRR2    
1.67N4 
(0.86) 
1.4N4 
(0.73) 
4.6N4 
(2.51)** 
MWD 
-0.233 
(-0.63) 
-0.365 
(-1.03) 
-0.488 
(-1.41) 
   
POPG 1.06 0.752 0.790 1.06 1.10 0.544 
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(3.05)*** (2.23)** (2.39)** (2.98)*** (3.13)*** (1.60) 
INVP  
-0.0182 
(-0.31) 
   
-0.0187 
(-0.33) 
y0 
-6.73N5 
(-3.06)*** 
-1.06N4 
(-2.94)*** 
-1.49N4 
(-5.58)*** 
-6.68N5 
(-3.00)*** 
-2.92N5 
(-1.00) 
-1.25N4 
(-3.53)*** 
GSIZE  
-0.0610 
(-1.16) 
-0.0334 
(-0.79) 
  
-0.0692 
(-1.36) 
TRADE  
0.0207 
(4.36)*** 
0.0225 
(5.12)*** 
  
0.0239 
(4.97)*** 
GDP  
2.38N13 
(1.67)* 
2.97N13 
(2.29)** 
  
2.97N13 
(2.11)** 
YR  
-0.326 
(-1.80)* 
  
-0.377 
(-1.94)* 
-0.316 
(-1.80)* 
Constant 
6.12 
(10.58)*** 
7.80 
(3.71)*** 
6.80 
(6.92)*** 
6.19 
(11.10)*** 
6.31 
(11.40)*** 
8.15 
(3.98)*** 
R2 0.159 0.385 0.361 0.166 0.200 0.422 
# of obs. 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Notes:  
1. Please refer to the notes to Tables 1, 2M and 8AS. 
2. Based on the estimate in YOE3, the first order effect of YRR on GR equals 0.0338. The marginal 
effect of YRR reaches zero with YRR* = 36.7. Evaluated at YRR*, the reduction in growth rate 
equals 0.62, or 12 percent, evaluated at the mean of 5.32 reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
 
The estimations of MOE3 and YOE3 indicate that after TRADE and GDP are included in the 
model, the significance of the MWL variables increases substantially.28 
6.  Conclusion 
It is the incentive structure imbedded in the institutional/organizational structure of economies that 
has to be the key to unraveling the puzzle of uneven and erratic growth. -- Douglas C. North 
Our estimates made under various specifications suggest that countries with MWL 
typically have a growth rate of about 20 to 30 percent lower than the mean in our sample periods. 
The effect of MWL on GDP growth rate is small in initial years with the first order effect of 
typically less than 0.1 percentage point. However, at the ‘steady state’ where the marginal effect of 
the legislation years equals zero, a country will have a growth rate about 30 to 38 percent lower 
than the sample mean. The results suggest that the longer the MWL have been in place, the more 
destructive they are to an economy. In this study, we use a methodology that has generated a long 
                                                            
28 This phenomenon is not observed in its ASIAE counterparts. The IT revolution and its impacts appear to have 
particularly beneficial to ‘mature economies’ like those of the OECD that have the ready institutions, technology and 
capital to tap the benefits from the technological breakthrough. 
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series of consistent results in other studies to investigate the effects of MWL on economic 
performances. The conclusions are based on a substantial body of empirical evidences of 
remarkable consistency. Refuting them requires a more persuasive system of models be formulated 
and different results are generated with a similar or improved data set. An alternative way of doing 
so is to employ the same estimation system, use another well-accepted data set, and generate 
opposite results with a comparable level of consistency. These efforts would allow comparison 
between investigations and the truth of the matter will finally emerge when sufficient research has 
accumulated. 
Our contribution to the literature is twofold. The first and obvious contribution of our 
finding is that MWL has a detrimental effect on economic performance. Given that MWL is 
extensively adopted across countries and also generally approved by international organizations, 
our findings will have very important policy implications. At a higher level, we give an example to 
illustrate how a bad institution, the rules of the game governing economic interactions, ultimately 
determines economic performances, and the rise or decline of economies over time. 
Let us go back to an important question raised in the classic article by Stigler 
(1946): is there any better alternative to MWL for reducing poverty? Based on our current 
knowledge, the answer is definitely ‘yes.’ Most countries are likely to experience a decline in the 
share of national income that goes to wages. (Global Wage Report 2008/09). However, this does 
not imply that we have to impose MWL. Governments should think about using a wider set of 
tools including the creation of a more equal opportunity environment by supplying productive 
public infrastructures, reducing unproductive taxes while capturing unearned land-rent to support 
public services, and reducing rent-seeking activities such as corruption, unproductive transfers and 
subsidies. These initiatives would have far greater benefits for the wellbeing of the poor and 
society as a whole than MWL.29 Far from eradicating poverty among the lowly paid, MWL 
prolong and even exacerbate it. There is little argument that productivity and economic growth 
foster the productive use of labor, the main asset of the poor, and can lead to a rapid reduction in 
the incidence of poverty (see, among many others, Squire, 1993 and Dollar and Kraay, 2002) It is 
simply not realistic to expect significant sustained wage growth to the protected poor when 
productivity and GDP growth rates are retarded by MWL.  
                                                            
29 For instance, Mo (1996, 2001, 2003, 2007, 2009). 
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  Appendixes: 
Table A1.MDUM: Estimations with Year and Regional Dummy 
Indep. Var. GR INVP POPG GSIZE GINV PINSTAB dHUM ENR.P ENR.H GR 
MWD -1.02 (-2.29)** 
-0.0319 
(-4.21)***
-0.0964 
(-0.89) 
0.00918 
(1.08) 
-0.00558 
(-0.87) 
0.00924 
(0.35) 
-0.105 
(-1.34) 
-0.0132 
(-0.80) 
0.195 
(0.56) 
-0.637 
(-1.49) 
y0 
-4.90N4 
(-3.02)*** 
3.01N6 
(1.04) 
-5.47N5 
(-1.39) 
-8.89N6 
(-2.87)***
2.88N6 
(1.24) 
-2.10N5 
(-2.20)** 
-4.79N5 
(-1.68)* 
-2.08N6 
(-0.34) 
9.42N5 
(0.74) 
-5.20N4 
(-3.31)***
HUM 0.211 (1.54) 
-1.54N4 
(-0.05) 
-0.131 
(-3.95)***
0.0105 
(4.01)*** 
-0.00590 
(-3.01)***
-9.02N4 
(-0.11) 
0.103 
(4.26)*** 
0.0220 
(4.32)*** 
0.0185 
(0.17) 
0.215 
(1.40) 
POPG  3.47N4 (0.07)        
0.828 
(3.11)*** 
INVP          12.6 (3.17) 
GSIZE  0.0208 (0.32)        
-8.48 
(-2.41) 
GINV  -0.188 (-1.98)**        
2.06 
(0.40) 
PINSTAB  -0.0313 (-1.51)        
-2.26 
(-2.00)** 
dHUM  0.00217 (0.33)        
-0.509 
(-1.44) 
ENR.P  0.106 (3.00)***        
4.85 
(2.46)** 
ENR.H  -3.77N4 (-0.25)        
-0.236 
(-2.86)***
YR -1.06 (-4.15)*** 
-0.00654 
(-1.08) 
0.0289 
(0.47) 
0.00968 
(1.98)** 
0.00716 
(1.95)* 
0.0124 
(0.82) 
0.0705 
(1.56) 
0.00731 
(0.76) 
2.55 
(12.82)***
-0.307 
(-0.94) 
ASIAE 0.487 (0.60) 
0.0401 
(2.90)*** 
-0.0504 
(-0.26) 
-0.0231 
(-1.50) 
-0.0226 
(-2.00)** 
0.0119 
(0.25) 
-0.156 
(-1.10) 
0.0563 
(1.88)* 
0.260 
(0.42) 
-0.435 
(-0.57) 
LAAM  -2.53 (-3.82)*** 
-0.00910 
(-0.75) 
0.118 
(0.74) 
-0.0336 
(-2.66)***
-0.0396 
(-4.25)***
0.0601 
(1.56) 
-0.0957 
(-0.82) 
0.0690 
(2.80)*** 
0.678 
(1.34) 
-2.91 
(-4.41)***
OECD -0.950 (-1.07) 
0.0149 
(0.94) 
-0.722 
(-3.36)***
-0.0278 
(-1.64) 
-0.0498 
(-4.01)***
0.0484 
(0.94) 
-0.0635 
(-0.41) 
0.0537 
(1.63) 
-1.09 
(-1.59) 
-1.24 
(-1.45) 
SAFRICA -2.86 (-3.31)*** 
-0.00256 
(-0.17) 
0.199 
(0.95) 
0.0311 
(1.89)* 
-0.0281 
(-2.26) 
0.00149 
(0.03) 
-0.171 
(-1.13) 
-0.00804 
(-0.25) 
-0.593 
(-0.89) 
-2.34 
(-2.86)***
Constant 8.80 (10.27)*** 
0.0930 
(2.66)*** 
2.82 
(13.57)***
0.142 
(8.69)*** 
0.117 
(9.57)*** 
0.111 
(2.21)** 
0.122 
(0.81) 
0.785 
(24.62)***
-3.61 
(-5.46)***
1.62 
(0.84) 
R2 0.281 0.373 0.571 0.194 0.225 0.104 0.139 0.290 0.499 0.470 
# of obs. 216 203 216 216 209 214 216 214 213 203 
Note: Please refer to the notes to Tables 1 and 2M.   
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Table A1.YDUM: Estimations with Year and Regional Dummy 
Indep. Var. GR INVP POPG GSIZE GINV PINSTAB dHUM ENR.P ENR.H GR 
YRE  -0.0643 (-2.14)** 
 -0.00110 
(-2.12)** 
 -0.0120 
(-1.68)* 
 5.34N4 
(0.93) 
 -0.00127 
(-3.04)*** 
 3.15N4 
(0.18) 
 -0.00692 
(-1.32) 
 -0.00131 
(-1.18) 
 0.0212 
(0.92) 
 -0.0364 
(-1.30) 
YRE2 8.55N4 (1.76)* 
7.42N6 
(0.89) 
2.8N4 
(2.43)** 
-1.10N5 
(-1.18) 
1.92N5 
(2.86)*** 
-3.18N6 
(-0.11) 
4.13N5 
(0.49) 
1.58N5 
(0.88) 
-3.17N4 
(-0.85) 
4.15N4 
(0.93) 
y0 
-4.66N4 
(-2.87)*** 
3.71N6 
(1.27) 
-5.21N5 
(-1.35) 
-9.19N6 
(-2.98)*** 
2.80N6 
(1.24) 
-2.13N5 
(-2.24)** 
-4.65N5 
(-1.64) 
-1.94N6 
(-0.32) 
9.23N5 
(0.73) 
-5.09N4 
(-3.24)*** 
HUM 0.218 (1.56) 
0.00155 
(0.52) 
-0.145 
(-4.36)*** 
0.0110 
(4.12)*** 
-0.00589 
(-3.01)*** 
-9.85N4 
(-0.12) 
0.111 
(4.54)*** 
0.0225 
(4.35)***
0.0186 
(0.17) 
0.233 
(1.46) 
POPG  0.00305 (0.60)        
0.86 
(3.16)*** 
INVP          13.0 (3.31)*** 
GSIZE  -0.00499 (-0.075)        
-8.74 
(-2.46)** 
GINV  -0.212 (-2.15)**        
1.19 
(0.22) 
PINSTAB  -0.0349 (-1.66)*        
-2.32 
(-2.05)** 
dHUM  5.79N4 (0.09)        
-0.537 
(-1.50) 
ENR.P  0.104 (2.89)***        
4.81 
(2.44)** 
ENR.H  -6.43N4 (-0.41)        
-0.239 
(-2.87)*** 
YR -1.07 (-4.16)*** 
-0.00582 
(-0.94) 
0.0207 
(0.34) 
0.0102 
(2.08)** 
0.00769 
(2.14)** 
0.0126 
(0.84) 
0.0754 
(1.68)* 
0.0078 
(0.81) 
2.54 
(12.8)*** 
-0.290 
(-0.88) 
ASIAE 0.383 (0.46) 
0.0377 
(2.61)*** 
-0.0214 
(-0.11) 
-0.0251 
(-1.60) 
-0.0283 
(-2.50)** 
0.0115 
(0.24) 
-0.203 
(-1.41) 
0.0503 
(1.65) 
0.322 
(0.51) 
-0.567 
(-0.72) 
LAAM  -2.54 (-3.82)*** 
-0.00959 
(-0.77) 
0.112 
(0.71) 
-0.0341 
(-2.69)*** 
-0.0418 
(-4.57)*** 
0.0595 
(1.54) 
-0.103 
(-0.89) 
0.0671 
(2.72)***
0.702 
(1.38) 
-2.96 
(-4.44)*** 
OECD -1.23 (-1.36) 
0.00782 
(0.48) 
-0.739 
(-3.44)*** 
-0.0268 
(-1.56) 
-0.0552 
(-4.46)*** 
0.0499 
(0.95) 
-0.111 
(-0.70) 
0.0471 
(1.40) 
-1.01 
(-1.45) 
-1.46 
(-1.67)* 
SAFRICA -2.95 (-3.34)*** 
-0.00287 
(-0.18) 
0.203 
(0.97) 
0.0290 
(1.72)* 
-0.0371 
(-2.97)*** 
1.92N4 
(0.004) 
-0.217 
(-1.41) 
-0.0155 
(-0.47) 
-0.498 
(-0.74) 
-2.47 
(-2.91)*** 
Constant 8.65 (10.30)*** 
0.0803 
(2.25)** 
2.85 
(14.25)*** 
0.144 
(9.02)*** 
0.125 
(10.70)*** 
0.115 
(2.33)** 
0.115 
(0.79) 
0.788 
(2.53)***
-3.66 
(-5.66)***
1.54 
(0.79) 
R2 0.280 0.357 0.586 0.195 0.257 0.104 0.154 0.294 0.501 0.470 
# of obs. 216 203 216 216 209 214 216 214 213 203 
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Table A2: Data Sources, Regressions 1970-1985 
Variables  involved Original Source 
Real GDP per capita Summers and Heston (1988), GDPSH4 
Total population Same, POP 
Ratio of real government “consumption” expenditure to real GDP Same, GOVSH4 
Ratio of real domestic investment (private plus public) to real GDP Same (1988), INVSH4 
Ratio of nominal public domestic investment to nominal GDP Same, INVPUB 
Average schooling years in the total population over age 25 in 1970, 1985 (proxy 
for human capital stock) 
Barro and Lee, HUMAN 
Measure of political instability Same, PINSTAB 
Dummy for East Asian , Latin-American, OECD, Sub-Saharan African Countries Same, ASIAE, LAAM, OECD, SAFRICA 
Total gross enrollment ratio for primary education UNESCO, H 
Total gross enrollment ratio for higher education UNESCO, H 
 
Table A3: Data Source, Regressions 1985-2004 
Variables  involved Source 
GDP per capita (PPPs) World Bank  
Total population International Financial Statistics  
GDP by Type of Expenditure - National currency United Nations  
Real Government “Consumption” Expenditure – National Currency Same 
Real Gross Investment Expenditure – National Currency Same 
Total Export – National Currency Same 
Total Import – National Currency Same 
 
 
Table A3AS : Correlations and Descriptive Statistics, ASIAE 
 GR YRR MWD POPG INVP GSIZE TRADE y0 YR 
GR 1         
YRR -0.26 1        
MWD -0.38 0.52 1       
POPG -0.01 0.22 -0.05 1      
INVP 0.39 -0.26 -0.49 -0.13 1     
GSIZE -0.25 0.21 0.25 0.48 -0.44 1    
TRADE 0.07 -0.09 -0.66 0.28 0.34 0.01 1   
y0 -0.09 -0.22 0.20 -0.60 0.18 -0.62 -0.34 1  
YR -0.57 0.22 0.12 -0.16 -0.11 -0.09 0.19 0.41 1 
Mean 7.58 18.46 0.83 1.89 27.29 14.98 130.91 1.76E11 2.46 
(S.D.) 3.54 16.38 0.38 0.82 7.24 7.99 91.26 2.00E11 1.12 
Notes: 
1. The statistics are based on the panel data set of 5 years in the period 1985-2004. 
2.  The above correlation coefficients are based on 35 observations 
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Table A3OECD : Correlations and Descriptive Statistics, OECD 
 GR YRR MWD POPG INVP GSIZE TRADE y0 YR 
GR 1         
YRR -0.03 1        
MWD 0.01 0.71 1       
POPG 0.27 0.24 0.13 1      
INVP -0.13 0.08 0.09 0.01 1     
GSIZE -0.21 -0.10 -0.13 -0.37 -0.46 1    
TRADE 0.23 -0.19 -0.06 0.10 -0.10 0.03 1   
y0 -0.11 0.34 0.27 0.06 -0.04 -0.19 -0.34 1  
YR -0.31 0.14 0.03 0.09 0.22 -0.12 0.29 0.14 1 
Mean 5.32 31.75 0.72 0.66 22.76 18.54 75.73 7.53E11 2.50 
(S.D.) 1.71 28.15 0.45 0.48 3.13 3.81 46.30 1.50E12 1.12 
Notes:  
1. The statistics are based on the panel data set of 5 years in the period 1985-2004. 
2. The above correlation coefficients are based on 96 observations. 
                                                                 
Table A3LIST: List of the ASIAE and OECD Countries, Regressions 1985-2004 
ASIAE Countries 
Fiji Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore 
Solomon Islands Thailand Papua New Guinea    
                   OECD Countries  
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland 
France Germany, West Greece Iceland Ireland Italy 
Japan Luxembourg Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal 
Spain Sweden Sweitzerland Turkey United Kingdom United States 
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Table A4: Data Set for the MWL Variables Used in Regressions 1975-1985 
  <can be left out in publication version> 
Country name ILO Earliest Recorded Legislation on Wage-Labor Market  Modified date of MWL Introduced 
Algeria 27-Jun-1981: Law No. 81-07 concerning apprenticeships 1978: Reference (1) 
Angola 1-Feb-2000: General Labour Law (Lei Geral do Trabalho), Act No. 2/2000  
Benin n.a.  
Botswana 1-Aug-1980: Regulation of wages Order  
Burkina Faso 15-Jan-1997: Decree No. 97-007/PRES/PM/MEF/MFPMA  
Burundi n.a.  
Cameroon n.a.  
Cape verde n.a.  
Central African Rep. n.a.  
Chad 19-Oct-1994: Decree No. 273/PR/MFPT/94  
Comoros n.a.  
Congo n.a.  
Egypt n.a.  
Ethiopia n.a.  
Gabon 21-Nov-1994: Labour Code, Act No. 3/94  
Gambia n.a.  
Ghana 1969: Labour Regulations, 1969 (LI 632) (No. 632 of 1969) Official Gazette  
Guinea n.a.  
Guinea-Bissau 4-Apr-1988: Decree 17/88  
Cote d'Ivoire n.a.  
Kenya n.a.  
Lesotho 1992: Labour Code Order 1992  
Liberia n.a.  
Madagascar 2-Jan-1990: Law No. 89-027 concerning free trade zones in Madagascar  
Malawi n.a.  
Mali n.a.  
Mauritania n.a.  
Mauritius 7-Feb-1974: Industrial Relations Act 1974  
Morocco 1-May-2000: Bulletin officiel, No. 4800 of 1 May 2000  
Mozambique 9-Mar-1994: Decree No. 7/94  
Niger n.a.  
Nigeria 29-May-1974: Labour Act, (Chapter 198), Decree No. 21 of 1974  
Rwanda n.a.  
Senegal 19-Feb-1996: Decree No. 96-154 of 19 February 1996  
Seychelles n.a.  
Sierra Leone n.a.  
Somalia n.a.  
South Africa n.a. No MW: Ref. (2) 
Sudan n.a.  
Swaziland n.a.  
Tanzania n.a.  
Togo n.a.  
Tunisia 30-Apr-1966: Labour Code  
Ugenda n.a.  
Zaire n.a.  
Zambia n.a.  
Zimbabwe n.a. No MW: Ref. (2) 
Bahamas, The 2001: Minimum Wages Act, 2001  
Barbados 1-Jul-1961: Domestic Employees Chap. 344  
Canada 1985 : Canada Labour Code R.S. 1985 1918: Ref. (5) & (6) 
Costa Rica 27-Aug-1943: Labour Code Law N. 2 1943: Ref. (7) 
Dominica 28-Mar-1977: Labour Standards Act, 1977, Chap. 89:05  
Dominican Rep. 29-May-1992: Labour Code, Law 1692  
El Salvador 23-Jun-1972: Labour Code, Decree 15  
Grenada 1999: Employment Act  
Guatemala 1995: Labour Code  
Haiti 12-Sep-1961: Labour Code of 12 September 1961  
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Honduras 5-Jul-1959: Labour Code, Decree 189-59  
Jamaica 1954: Minimum Wage Act (Chap. 252) Law 58 of 1954  
Mexico 17-Jan-2006: Federal Labour Law 1917: Ref. (5) 
Nicaragua 24-May-1991: Law on Minimum Wage, Law 129  
Panama 1995: Labour Code  
St. Lucia n.a.  
St. Vincent & Grens. n.a.  
Trinidad & Tobago 1976: Minimum Wages Act 1976, Act No. 35 of 1976, Chap. 88:04  
United States 1935: National Labor Relations Act of 1935 1938: Ref. (5) & (6) 
Argentina 12-Nov-1941: Law on Home Workers No. 12.713 1946: Ref. (7) 
Bolivia 8-Dec-1942: General Labour Act  
Brazil 1-May-1940: Legislative Decree No. 2162 of 1 May 1940  
Chile 1958: Law 12.927, Concerning State Security  
Colombia 07-Jul-1951: Substantive Labour Code  
Ecuador 29-Sep-1997: Labour Code, Official Registry No. 162  
Guyana n.a.   
Paraguay 29-Oct-1993: Law No. 213 enacting the Labour Code  
Peru 26-Jun-1992 Decree Law 25593 
1916: Ref. (7) 
Suriname n.a.  
Uruguay 04-Aug-1937: Law No. 9.675 1943: Ref. (7)  
Venezuela 19-Jun-1997: Organic Labour Law  
Afghanistan n.a.  
Baharin n.a.  
Bangladesh 23-May-1936: Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (Act IV of 1936)  
Myanmar (Burma) n.a.  
China 05-Jul-1994: Labour Act of the Peoples' Republic of China  
Hong Kong n.a. No MW: Ref. (3) 
India 1947: Industrial Disputes Act  
Indonesia 1981: Government Regulation No. 8 of 1981 on the Protection of Wages  
Iran, I.R. of n.a.  
Iraq n.a.  
Israel 1953: Apprenticeship Law, 5713-1953 Labour Laws  
Japan n.a. 1959: Ref. (5) & (6) 
Jordan n.a.  
Korea 31-Dec-1986: Minimum Wage Act, Act No. 3927 1988: Ref. (5) & (6) 
Kuwait n.a.  
Malaysia 1947: Wages Council Act, 1947, Act 195  
Nepal n.a.  
Oman n.a.  
Pakistan 28-Sep-1961: Minimum Wages Ordinance, 1961  
Philippines 1974: Labour Code of the Philippines Presidential Decree No. 442  
Saudi Arabia 2006: Labour Law (Royal Decree No. M/51)  
Singapore 2004: Industrial Relations Act, CAP 136 No MW: Ref. (8) 
Sri Lanka n.a. 1927: Ref. (3) 
Syria 1958: Organization of Agricultural Relations Act, No. 134 of 1958  
Taiwan n.a. 1984: Ref. (8) 
Thailand 12-Feb-1998: Labour Protection Act B.E. 2541  
United Arab Emirates n.a.  
Yemen, N.Arab n.a.  
Austria 1974: Collective Labour Relations Act (Arbeitsverfassungsgesetz, ArbVG) Federal Official Gazette No. 22/1974 
No MW: Ref. (6) 
Belgium 29-May-1952: Act establishing the National Labour Council 1975: Ref. (5) & (6) 
Cyprus 1941: Minimum Wage Act (Cap. 183)  
Denmark n.a. 1977: Ref. (4) 
Finland 1946: Collective Agreements Act 436/1946 No MW: Ref. (6) 
France 1973: Labour Code 1950: Ref. (5) & (6) 
Germany, West 1949: Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany 1947: Ref. (4) 
Greece 22-Mar-1989: Act No. 1837 concerning the protection of young persons in employment and other provisions 
1953: Ref. (5) & (6) 
Hungary 04-May-1992: abour Code Act No. 22 of 1992 Magyar Kozlony, 1977: Ref. (5) & (6) 
Iceland 1938: Act No. 80 of 1938 on trade unions and industrial disputes No MW: Ref. (6) 
Ireland 31-Mar-2000: National Minimum Wage Act, 2000, Act No. 5 of 2000 2000: Ref. (6) 
Italy 1865: Civil Code 1954: Ref. (4) 
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Luxembourg 23-Dec-1973: Act of 23 December 1973, concerning the reform of the minimum wage 
1944: Ref. (5) & (6) 
Malta 1989: Wage Increase National Standard Order, Notice No. 169 of 1989  
Netherlands 24-Dec-1927: Act of 24 December 1927 to issue detailed regulations respecting collective agreements 
1968: Ref. (5) & (6) 
Norway 05-May-1927: Labour Disputes Act No.1 No MW: Ref. (6) 
Poland n.a. 1990: Ref. (5) & (6) 
Portugal 02-Apr-1976: Constitution of Portugal 1974: Ref. (5) & (6) 
Spain 29-Dec-1978: National Constitution 1963: Ref. (5) & (6) 
Sweden 1976: Act on co-determination at work No MW: Ref. (6) 
Switzerland 30-Mar-1911: Code of Obligations of 30 March 1911 No MW: Ref. (6) 
Turkey 07-Nov-1982: Constitution of the Republic of Turkey of 7 November 1982, Law No. 2709 
1971: Ref. (5) & (6) 
United Kingdom 13-Jul-1948: Agricultural Wages Act, 1948  
Yugoslavia n.a.  
Australia 1988: Workplace Relations Act 1996, Act No. 86 1901: Ref. (6) 
Fiji 1957: Wages Councils Act No. 9 of 1957  
New Zealand 1983: Minimum Wage Act, 1983, No.115/1983 1945: Ref. (5) & (6) 
Papua New Guinea 1962: Industrial Relations Act 1962, Chapter 174  
Solomon Islands 1981: The Labour Act (Chapter 73) Official Gazette  
Tonga n.a.  
Vanuatu n.a.  
Western Samoa n.a.  
Notes:  
1. All data in the second column are based on the International Labour Organization (ILO) Minimum Wage Database.  
At: www.ilo.org/travaildatabase/  (access date: July, 2009).  
2. Data in the third column show the modified items and the source(s) of the information that are listed in the 
references to Table A5. 
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